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In a recent issue of this Review, we presented a comprehensive
analysis of passing on and a method for assigning causes of action
to indirect purchasers in cases involving monopoly overcharges.1
Immediately before publication (literally with galley proofs in
hand), we received from the mailroom an article by Professors
Landes and Posner on the same topic. 2 Given the direct relevance
of their article and that our respective analyses reached opposite
policy conclusions, we made several references to Landes and Posner
in footnotes to our article. In the preceding pages they have
replied to those comments.3 In responding to their Reply, we
seek to emphasize the basic differences which distinguish our ap-
proach from theirs, differences which lead to opposite conclusions.
Although there are important technical differences between our
approach to the passing-on issue and that of Landes and Posner,
the fundamental disagreement between us relates to the nature of
economic theory and the use of that theory in legal and policy
analysis. This disagreement is signified by the Landes and Posner
criticism of our analytical "inconsistency." "Harris and Sullivan,"
they say, "are free if they like to reject the premises of economic
theory; but then we question the appropriateness of their employ-
ing those premises to argue earlier in their article that most of a
monopoly overcharge will be passed on." 4
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We reject Landes and Posner's belief that economic theory
is a doctrine, comprehensive and complete, which must be accepted
or rejected in all-or-nothing fashion. We also reject their implicit
premise that there is but one "right" brand of economic theory.
Economic thought has an eclectic history, and it continues to de-
velop along several lines. There have always been, and continue to
be, alternative styles of economics. Among the modern choices,
the self-designated "Chicago school" style of Landes and Posner is
but one.
In our view, economic theories offer valuable insights into
issues of central importance to antitrust policy formulation and
adjudication. Economic theories do not, however, ask all of the
salient questions, much less answer them. Economics provides
intellectually rich abstractions of economic realities, but they re-
main abstractions nonetheless. Far more is needed to understand
the behavioral complexities of a modern economy. In recognition
of the power of economic theory, we employed it in the first part
of our article; in recognition of the limits of economic theory, we
supplemented it by reference to empirical observations of man-
agerial behavior and organizational performance.
Nowhere is this fundamental disagreement regarding the ap-
propriate uses of economic theory more apparent than in the first
section of the Landes-Posner Reply, to which we respond at some
length in our next section. Thereafter, we comment briefly upon
several of our other differences with Landes and Posner regarding
the issue of passing on.
I. PRICE SETrING By DmcT PURCHASERS
A central concern of our analysis was compensatory justice.
We argued that, based upon economic theory and empirical evi-
dence regarding commercial pricing practices, direct purchasers
would, in the great majority of cases, pass on most, all, or even more
than one hundred percent of a monopoly overcharge by raising
prices to their customers (that is, the indirect, or downstream, pur-
chasers of the antitrust violators). We further showed that direct
purchasers that had won an antitrust suit and recovered damages
under the rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois5 would not, ordi-
narily, "pass back" that damage award to downstream purchasers,
even if the monopoly overcharge had been passed on. Expanding
upon this showing, we reviewed sixty-five government price-fixing
5431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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cases either won by the government or disposed of on a nolo con-
tendere plea during the period from 1963 to 1974 (which we
assumed were not atypical) and concluded that in a majority of
those cases there was a high rate of passing on.6
Landes and Posner do not directly take issue with these show-
ings. Instead, they claim that compensatory justice is achieved
in a rather ingenious way: while direct purchasers may pass on the
monopoly overcharge, they will also pass on the prospective Illinois
Brick damage award. They claim that if direct purchasers increase
prices by the amount of the overcharge, they will also reduce prices
by an amount equal to the present discounted value of the expected
damage award.7 In other words, what the direct purchaser passes
on with one hand, it passes back with the other!
In responding to their argument, we noted that Landes
and Posner had "confused marginal costs and fixed costs," 1 an
observation to which they take exception. Before considering the
treatment of marginal costs, let us consider two critical precedent
events: discovery of the violation and response to the violation by
the direct purchaser.
Before managers can decide what to do with gains of anticipated
litigation against specific suppliers, they first must discover the
violation. Often, direct purchasers do not even suspect they are
paying an overcharge; presumably, cartelists attempt to keep their
conspiracy secret in order to avoid prosecution. Indeed, in a dif-
ferent context, Landes and Posner acknowledge that "the violation
... [may be] concealed by the violators" and that this "is almost
always the case with regard to price fixing, the principal offense
to which the rule of Illinois Brick is applicable." 9 If managers
lack information regarding the infraction, on what basis would
they calculate the expected gains from future litigation?
At some point, of course, direct purchasers may learn of an
antitrust violation and corresponding overcharges. But at that
point, why would they behave, as Landes and Posner suggest, by
passing on the expected gains from litigation through price re-
ductions to their customers? Why would they not take immediate
legal action against the violators? In assessing the deterrent effects
of alternative assignments of the cause of action, Landes and Posner
argue vigorously for assignment to direct purchasers on the grounds
6 See Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 321-38.
7 Landes & Posner Article, supra note 2, at 605-08.
8 Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 298-99 n.67.
) Landes & Posner Reply, supra note 3, at 1276.
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that they have better information and greater incentive to sue.
If they have information and incentive, why wait to bring suit?
It was on these grounds that we argued that prospective gains
must be seen as "windfalls." We think that it is highly unlikely that
managers would view those gains as a stream of benefits closely
related to the volume of production or sales. As Landes and Posner
note, "the actual effect [of price-fixing conspiracies] on price is
not considered systematically" 10 by courts in government prosecu-
tions. Even in private damage actions, price effects can only be
approximated. If courts, after the event, cannot relate damage
awards precisely to actual price effects, why expect that managers
will treat anticipated damage awards with such precision?
There is one other possible scenario which may be implicit
in the Landes-Posner argument regarding price setting by direct
purchasers in anticipation of gains from litigation. Suppose that,
though managers of the firm do not know of any specific antitrust
violation, they are aware of the Illinois Brick rule, and therefore
realize that there are prospective gains from as yet unknown and
unspecified litigation. By what mechanism might managers trans-
late that knowledge into pricing decisions? Because Chicago
theories ignore these behavioral issues, Landes and Posner offer
no clues about the actual bureaucratic processes by which these
price reductions would occur. Yet we can easily infer what kind
of conduct would be required, based upon general knowledge of
organizational behavior. When we do so it becomes clear that
the Chicago theorists, by ignoring the behavioral issues, have
reached an exceedingly dubious result.
If the managers of a direct purchaser were following the
Landes-Posner scenario, they might view the purchase of inputs
as consisting of two separate components: (1) the tangible product
as specified in the invoice; and (2) the possible antitrust cause of
action which under Illinois Brick accrues immediately upon pay-
ment of an overcharge to the direct purchaser. The price of the
tangible product would of course be a positive cost which should
be accounted for in the pricing decision, but the value of the cause
of action would be counted as a negative cost. In order to make
the proper "marginal cost" pricing decision, the direct purchaser
would have to capitalize the present value of a cause of action
for an unknown overcharge associated with each unit of each dif-
ferent input. To do so, it would have to gather information and
make judgments about such factors as the likelihood of an over-
io Id. 1277 n.9.
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charge on each of the inputs in the production process, the likely
magnitude and duration of any such overcharge, the likely cost of
the overcharge litigation, the risk that the litigation might fail, and
even the possibility that Congress might act legislatively to change
the Illinois Brick rule.
Information of that sort would be fragmentary supposition,
and judgments based on it appallingly speculative. The inquiry,
moreover, would be expensive. Data would have to be collected,
legal opinions sought, meetings among managers convened, infor-
mation and speculation evaluated and analyzed. Managers do not
engage in such time-consuming or costly searches for a will-o'-the
wisp; they attempt to manage only what seems manageable. Yet
nowhere do Landes and Posner mention these information costs,
much less their implication for their argument. Failure to account
for information or transaction costs-or treating them as trivial-
is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Chicago-school
tradition. In some cases (abstract modeling, for example), the
assumptions that information is perfect and that transactions are
costless allows for simplicity and elegance. In ascribing behavior
to real-world managers, however, those assumptions can blind one
to the truth.
The final irony of the Landes-Posner position is that, in the
event direct purchasers actually engaged in the sort of behavior
envisaged, managers would thereby produce records of the activity.
The existence of such business records is of dual significance. First,
if firms behave as Landes and Posner suppose (with respect not only
to antitrust but also to all other forms of litigation which has
potential damage awards), the empirical studies of industrial pric-
ing behavior would uncover such practices. In our survey of that
literature, we found no such evidence.'1 Second, however, if any
particular firm did follow the Landes-Posner scenario and actually
did pass on the value of the prospective damage award, that firm
would have records available which would prove that it had done
so. Thus, under our proposed reversal of Illinois Brick, that firm,
being able to prove that it had passed on, would be entitled to
recover the full amount of the overcharges it had paid.
All of this highlights another aspect of our disagreement with
Landes and Posner, their reliance upon "marginal cost pricing"
not merely as a theoretical construct but as a description of reality.
We reviewed, in some detail, the best available evidence re-
garding commercial pricing practices as they relate to the issue of
11 See Harris & Sullivan Article, supra note 1, at 299-309.
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passing on. Suffice it to say that there is little evidence that man-
agers "marginal cost price." We also noted certain conditions,
though, under which heuristic pricing practices (for example, cost-
plus or markup pricing) are equivalent to marginal-cost pricing.
Those conditions, it turns out, seldom apply, especially in the case
of multiproduct firms (like retail stores-very often one of the
links between monopoly overcharges and final consumers). Landes
and Posner neither challenged that evidence nor presented evidence
to support their position. Instead, marginal-cost pricing is merely
assumed, without recourse to empirical verification.
In sum, we remain convinced that, at least on the grounds of
compensatory justice, Illinois Brick should be reversed.
II. ELASTICITIES AND THE RATE OF PASSING ON.
In the theoretical part of our article,' 2 we noted that when
the elasticity of supply is infinite, the rate of passing on will be one
hundred percent, irrespective of the elasticity of demand. We also
showed that, over the long run, the elasticity of supply is, in most
industries, infinite or nearly so. Landes and Posner reply that
"[t]his argument fails to provide a ground for overruling Illinois
Brick for several reasons," 13 to which we respond here in turn.
In their first three of these arguments, Landes and Posner sug-
gest that our purpose was to imply that since all overcharges are
passed on in the long run, it is not "necessary in each individual
case to determine how much of the overcharge was passed on." 14
They read us, apparently, as trying to justify a per se rule which
assumes total passing on in all cases.
We have been misunderstood. We do not seek to avoid par-
ticularized analysis in individual cases. It is the Illinois Brick
rule championed by Landes and Posner which rejects case-by-case
analysis in favor of a per se approach. Under Illinois Brick all
cases involving monopoly overcharges are treated as if no passing
on has occurred. The primary goal of our analysis was not to
decide all cases-we have no such confidence in the predictive power
of economic theory. Rather, we were attempting to show that the
Illinois Brick rule produces the wrong result in most cases.
As Landes and Posner acknowledge, we also set forth, in addi-
tion to the economic theory of passing on, "a methodology for
determining the amount passed on in individual cases." 15 That
12 Id. 275-99.
13 Landes & Posner Reply, supra note 3, at 1276.
14 Id. These three arguments are contained in sections 2(a) through 2(c).
15 Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 315-21.
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methodology, which is not criticized in their reply, is adequate to
enable courts to make particularized judgments about the extent of
passing on which will be much closer to the precise truth than the
per se rule of Illinois Brick allows.
Landes and Posner also express concern that, even if in the
long run all of the monopoly overcharges are passed on, "if price
fixing occurs at irregular intervals . . . there is no presumption
that direct purchasers fully adjust to the overcharge each time it
occurs and thereby pass it on." 16 Again, it is factors of this kind
which are taken into account in our proposed case-by-case method-
ology. The outcome may lack precision, but reasonable judg-
ments based upon modest information can approximate the precise
truth as closely as it is ever possible to do in any complex litigation.
In their section 2(d), Landes and Posner attempt to cast doubt
upon our characterization of the long-run supply curve in most
industries. They point out that, if the long-run supply curve
is highly elastic, a rise in price due to cartel action would induce
entry, so that the "cartel would be ineffective." 17 Unfortunately,
they have mixed up the levels in the chain of distribution. It is
the elasticity of supply of the direct-purchaser industry that de-
termines the rate of passing on; we assume that the cartel action
occurs at the level above the direct purchasers-that is, the sellers to
the direct purchasers.
Finally, in section 2(e), Landes and Posner claim that "at most
all Harris and Sullivan have shown. . . is that the entire overcharge
is passed on to indirect purchasers" 18 and, thus, that the Illinois
Brick rule defeats compensatory justice in every case. We are quite
prepared to admit that compensatory justice is not the only objec-
tive of antitrust policy, but we think it symptomatic of the Chicago
school of economics to dismiss equity issues so cavalierly. Anti-
trust policy has historically been, and ought to continue to be, con-
cerned deeply with issues of economic equity and procedural
fairness.' 9 Of course efficiency matters, but it is not all that matters.
III. INFORMATION AND INCENTIVE TO SUE
In addition to compensatory justice, the second salient con-
cern of passing-on policy is deterrence. All else being equal, we
should choose that assignment of a cause of action that will provide
16 La-des & Posner Reply, supra note 3, at 1277.
17Id. 1278.
is Id
19 See Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLvM. L. REv. 1214 (1975) (HANDLER,
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the greatest probability of discovery and prosecution of monopoly
overcharge violations, thereby deterring potential violators. Landes
and Posner claim that, on the ground of deterrence, the Illinois
Brick rule is superior to our proposed alternative.
In reaching that judgment, Landes and Posner rely heavily
upon their claim that "[t]he information costs of identifying and
suing an antitrust violator, an important component of enforce-
ment costs, are lower for the direct than the indirect purchaser." 20
They say that we "accept [their] point that the direct purchaser
has lower information costs of identifying and prosecuting the
antitrust violator than a remote purchaser." 21 That quote from
Landes and Posner does not fairly represent our position. Al-
though we do acknowledge that "direct purchasers ...are closer
to the violation and thus may be in better position to be aware
of it," 22 we continue, however, by noting that "there are limits
to the significance of propinquity." 23
For deterrence the significant question is not which purchaser
has the lowest information cost but, given the balance of costs and
incentives, which purchaser is most likely to investigate, discover
the violation, and sue. The fewer purchasers at any given level in
the chain, the larger the share of each purchaser at that level of the
total damages allocable to that level. The direct-purchaser level
will often, but not always, have fewer firms than will lower levels.
There will also be those situations in which indirect purchasers
are fewer in number, or have better informational resources. Here,
deterrence argues for granting the cause of action to indirect
purchasers. One could cite no better example than the Illinois
Brick case itself: the indirect purchasers there were public agencies
represented by a single agent (the Illinois attorney general). By
comparing competitive-bid data, the state was in an excellent posi-
tion to detect and prosecute violators. Whether the direct pur-
chasers (the hundreds of building contractors who purchased
masonry products from the masonry manufacturers) knew of the
violation, we do not know. We do know that they did not take
legal action.
Granting the informational advantage to direct purchasers,
and supported by what Landes and Posner call "erroneous rea-
20 Landes & Posner Reply, supra note 3, at 1274.
21 Id. 1278.
2 2 Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 352 (emphasis added).
23 Id. 352-53.
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son," 24 we still challenged the incentives of direct purchasers to
sue. Experience teaches that, whatever their informational ad-
vantages, direct purchasers often fail to sue to recover overcharges
imposed by cartelists and monopolists. Landes and Posner, refer-
ring to their article, point out that when this occurs, the "supplier
must pay something to bind the direct purchaser to him and this
payment is, functionally, a form of antitrust damages." 25 That is
exactly our point: if the direct purchaser passes on the monopoly
charge but retains the "compensation" of the monopolist, the
compensatory injustice to the indirect purchaser is multiplied, and
deterrence is vitiated. We cannot accept the argument that the
sharing of illegally gotten proceeds with direct purchasers justifies
the rule of Illinois Brick.
We did not suggest, as Landes and Posner think we did, that
the direct purchaser's incentive to sue would not be reduced by the
possibility of a passing-on defense.28  We acknowledged such an
effect, but said:
It is the net effect of Illinois Brick that is important, how-
ever, and there is reason to believe that legislative reversal
would have a relatively small deterrent effect on suits by
direct purchasers and a much larger and more significant
effect in encouraging suits on behalf of down-chain pur-
chasers.
27
Additionally, Landes and Posner say that we described as fan-
tasy their "suggest[ion] that the incentives of a state attorney gen-
eral to sue might be different from those of a private firm." 28 We
did not find that suggestion in the Landes and Posner article; if
we did, we would have taken no issue with it. What Landes and
Posner did say in their article, and what we did call a fantasy, was
their quite different statement that a tendency may exist "for state
attorneys general to bring headline-grabbing, scapegoat-seeking
[parens patriae] suits against politically unpopular corporations,
with little regard for the intrinsic antitrust merit of the suit and
with little effort to press the suit to a successful conclusion." 29
Suffice it to say that we are aware of no theoretical or empirical
24 Landes & Posner Reply, supra note 3, at 1278.
2' Id.
26 Id. 1279.
27 Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 350 (emphasis in original).
28 Landes & Posner Reply, supra note 3, at 1279.
29 Landes & Posner Article, supra note 2, at 613.
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basis for fearing such a tendency. We must regard with skepticism
an analysis which confidently assumes, on the one hand, that an
individual making decisions for a private entity will tend to act
rationally, knowledgeably, and in the interest of that entity, and,
on the other hand, that an individual making decisions for a
public entity will tend to act impulsively, without adequate in-
formation, and in his own self-interest.
Finally, Landes and Posner take exception to our statements
regarding the disincentives of direct purchasers, particularly our
reference to their misunderstanding of managerial mentality.3 0 It
may well be a standard assumption of Chicago economic theory that
the loss of a windfall gain is equated to an out-of-pocket cost, but
that does not make it so in the minds of managers. Our position
is based upon a sense of the organizational factors and cultural
norms that constrain pure "profit-maximizing" behavior, behavioral
influences which Chicago theory ignores.
Rational decisionmaking within corporations is bounded;
people do not gather information about everything that might
conceivably be relevant. If a firm is able to pass on a price in-
crease from a particular supplier, that price increase is not likely
to be high on the firm's agenda of "possible antitrust claims to be
investigated when we have time." As antitrust practitioners well
appreciate, antitrust actions, like other lawsuits, are often initiated
by people who have a sense of having been hurt and a sense of
grievance.
Moreover, even if a firm learns that a monopoly overcharge
has occurred, there remains in the corporate community a real-
though not absolute-inhibition against undertaking the role of
bounty hunter. Indeed, it was not too many years ago that many
corporations hesitated, out of a sense of propriety, to bring private
antitrust actions even to redress real injuries (like monopoly over-
charges not passed on).
Again, our disagreement with Landes and Posner is funda-
mental. We do not deny that managers are economically rational,
but we insist they are boundedly so. The neoclassical "theory of
the firm" is really not a behavioral theory at all; few economists
think that economic theory describes how firms actually behave-
certainly there is little or no empirical substantiation to support
such a position. Economic theory is a set of assumptions about
firms, assumptions which economists make for the sake of simplicity
and analytical rigor.
3o Landes & Posner Reply, supra note 3, at 1279.
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It is our opinion that the Landes and Posner approach to
passing on epitomizes a generic failure of the Chicago school, a
failure to recognize and abide by the logical and empirical limits
of economic theory. Landes and Posner exihibit a classic case of
reification, of confusing models with realities. We think it makes
for bad economics; it makes for even worse antitrust policy.
The alternative is not, as Landes and Posner imply, to reject
the use of economic analysis entirely, but to moderate its use and,
when limitations of economic theory are encountered (and because
noneconomic factors also matter), to supplement the analysis as
seems appropriate. That is exactly what we tried to do in our ar-
ticle; if that is the charge against us, we demur.
